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the Mad Hatter at Tea  
with Austin and Wittgenstein 
 
 
He is the Rubens of philosophy. Richness, abundance, boldness, color, but a 





But there is a certain danger in not having to reach final conclusions: it's all too 






A Cautionary Introduction 
 
To speak of how Marshall McLuhan did what he did, when he did it and why, might 
seem to guarantee misunderstanding of him, for if only the medium is important, then, 
as he would gleefully have insisted, any such message must be trivial. To speak of what 
can only be shown is doubly suspect when, as here, I shall confound how McLuhan, 
Austin and Wittgenstein behaved, despite Wittgenstein having admonished us to avoid 
generalizing. And the danger will be trice compounded, for I shall generalize without 
citing examples of how they worked, writing for readers able to provide their own 
examples against which to measure the aptness of what I say.3 
  
 
1 William James, speaking of his colleague, Josiah Royce, in a letter to Dickinson Miller of 
31 January 1899, as quoted in Gerald E. Myers, William James: his Life and Thought (New Haven 
& London: Yale University Press, 1986), page 17. 
2 From Andre Tarkovsky, Sculpting in Time: Reflections on the Cinema, translated by 
Kitty Hunter-Blair (London: the Bodley Head, 1986), page 15. 
3 I shall presume, tongue firmly in cheek, that readers have pondered the life and works 
of McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy in particular, the principal papers of Austin and the core 
compilations early and late of Wittgenstein, trying to fit them within the patterns that 
biographers have uncovered within their performances and the cultures encompassing them, 
and I shall do so without citing sources, save cursorily. Like McLuhan, that is, I shall speak 
facetiously – perhaps! 
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Niceties aside, however, I have long been intrigued by philosophical ideas that were 
generated in western Europe and North America from about 1890 to the beginning of 
the second world war, the half-century during which the cinema found its roots, and 
especially those propounded by a group of thinkers (male every one) who have by now 
been relegated to the margins of our cultural world, among them Nietzsche, Peirce, 
Bergson, Spengler, Collingwood, Austin, Wittgenstein, Innis and more recently McLuhan 
– a group of men who, without exception and by common consent, had difficulty 
'getting their act together' intellectually as they became marginalized. The obstacles 
confronting them were diverse, idiosyncratic, sometimes physical and occasionally 
pathological, but even after causes are balanced against effects, a gaping question 
persists. 
 
Why were these thinkers unable late in life to summarise neatly how they 
were thinking, rendering it easy thereafter for others to disregard what 
they said? Or, reversing gear, why have so many commentators 
thereafter, shouting from within the centres of contemporary 
philosophical debate (whether male or female and whether writing in 
ethics, aesthetics, epistemology, ontology, logic, philosophy of science, 
philosophy of culture) found it so difficult to integrate the later work of 
these thinkers into the core of their discussions? 
 
I find this of particular importance as a teacher, for, as I teach within an environment 
dominated increasingly by a 'scientific' model of academic endeavour, I am convinced 
that I must strive especially to extend the franchise to thinkers who lived before me, 
simply to contravene the prevailing pseudo-scientific presumption that any text 
published more than a few minutes ago must be irrelevant. I, as a teacher, must 
unceasingly remind my students that other human beings, long since gone from this 
earth, may have been more right about many things than we are and occasionally more 
right than we could be (for success within the ahistorical conversation pervading the 
academy requires, for most participants, a preparatory act of historical blindness 
ensuring the perpetual reinvention of intellectual wheels that Wittgenstein aptly 
described as 'idling'). 
 
Which brings me to Marshall McLuhan who, whatever else may be said of him, surely 
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Part 1: 
 
The Classic-Comic Construal of McLuhan 
 
Let me sketch firstly a caricature of what McLuhan did and said shared by almost 
everyone of my acquaintance who has bothered to read in passing The Gutenberg 
Galaxy, McLuhan's finest book and assuredly the most provocative good book ever 
written on the subjects addressed therein, whether they respect or deny his 
achievement, and that in itself is remarkable. 
 
The Historical Argument: 
 
McLuhan tried to explain two shifts in the cultural evolution of western Europe and 
North America: the transition from literacy to print, and thereafter from print to the 
electronic media. 
 
His conjectures fit therefore within a standard model of historical explanation. His 
conclusions have formal precedents in the explanations offered by others for the earlier 
transitions within the culture from orality to literacy and encompass broad but 
derivative mappings of the historical periods under consideration that are at times 
accurate and penetrating. And since every step of his argument had been advanced 
earlier by other scholars, its content, although more contentious than its competitors, is 
comparably open to further historical investigation and refinement.4 
 
1. The driving force of cultural change is technological (echoing Mumford, 
Giedion, Innis). 
 
2. The nature of the technologies determine the shape of a culture, not the 
nature of the products that are generated by them (Mumford, Giedion, Innis 
again). 
 
3. The technologies of communication are uniquely powerful modifiers of a 
culture, for they constrain how its members may think about it (after Innis in 
particular – the technologies of communication are staples just like codfish, 
beaver pelts, or timber – but Mumford as well). 
 
 
4 My source for all matters relating to the life and works of Marshall McLuhan is the 
uniquely informative book by Philip Marchand, Marshall McLuhan: The Medium and the 
Messenger (Toronto, Ontario: Random House, 1989). As noted in footnote 3 above, I shall 
almost always use what he says without referring to the pages on which he says it.  
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4. Technologies extend the biological capacities of human beings, and the 
communication technologies extend, in particular, their sensory capacities (after 
Butler, Emerson, Ernst Kapp, Bergson, van Loon, Freud, Mumford, Fuller, Innis, 
Hall) 
 
5. Humans living within western Europe and North America are being 
compelled increasingly to perceive the events of the world only as mediated by 
the technologies of communication, and, as our compulsions spread across the 
world, we and its other inhabitants find ourselves reverting increasingly to a 
village-like sharing of a common sensory experience of it on a near-global scale 
(after Mumford). 
 
6. The effects of the technologies of communication upon the political, 
economic, and social institutions of nations will be pervasive, integrative, and 
remarkable, and if we are to prepare to work within them, we must come to 




But if McLuhan was simply echoing others who had spoken before him, why did he 
cause such a fuss? Why have so many commentators, among them some of the most 
open-minded, innovative, radical, careful and curious scholars in the world, dismissed 




McLuhan contaminated his reconstruction of the standard historical explanation, 
summarised above, by including within it a sub-category of claims resting upon an 
outmoded medieval conjecture about how our sensory modalities are integrated, and 
how the various technologies of communication are biased with respect to them. The 
conjecture, derived from Aquinas and Bacon (and later Hildebrand), is so obviously 
incorrect that McLuhan's allegiance to it, disregarding counterexamples at every hand, 
has led many to conclude that he must have been everywhere untrustworthy.  
 
The corrupting conjecture may be broadly sketched as follows: 
 
a. The sensory modalities of human beings living within the preliterate 
periods of our culture were seamlessly integrated (as they are for those living 
within any pre-literate culture).  
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b. Every preliterate encounter with the things of the world, therefore, 
involved all of the senses in integration. The ultimate sensory jury, however, 
were the auditory-tactile organs rather than, as now, the organs of sight. 
 
Literacy, until the advent of printing, was a visual-aid to an integrated 
auditory/tactile experience. 
 
c. The advent of printing destroyed the integrated auditory-tactile bias of 
our culture, reshaping it to a bias dominated by the single sense of sight.  
 
d. Dominated by the bias of the single sense of sight, our experience of the 
world became irrational, for we lacked the integration of the senses required to 
recognise it coherently. 
 
e. With the advent of the electronic technologies of communication, 
however, we depend no longer upon reading for most of our information about 
the world. We, with the others in our world, are increasingly less by the biases of 
the sense of sight; and as we learn again to encounter things through senses 
newly integrated, we shall find our culture returning to the integrated audio-
tactile social patterns common to preliterate cultures. 
 
Had McLuhan avoided entrapment in this medieval sensory morass, he would never 
have affirmed (or "outered", as he put it) such monstrosities as the claim that television 
is a "tactile" medium, or that reading a newspaper is an "auditory" experience. In the 
opinion of almost every commentator known to me, he would then have been far better 




Although McLuhan advanced broad historical conjectures about cultural change, his 
writings were ill-designed to facilitate historical comprehension of them. Indeed, he 
acted as if the common constraints upon historical writing, facilitating the testing of the 
conjectures being advanced, were somehow irrelevant to his goals. (The Gutenberg 
Galaxy, for example, was designed to appear as much like a medieval manuscript as 
possible: neither the argument nor the glosses are logically ordered; no indices are 
available to facilitate cross-referencing; contrary views are never mentioned; etc..) 
  
In the opinion of some (Marchand included), this exemplified a profound personality 
trait: McLuhan was simply too interested in new ideas and too fertile in generating 
 
5 Marchand, his biographer, among them. See Marchand, op. cit., page 146., 
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them, to take note of older ones. He was too busy looking ahead to look sideways, much 
less backwards, had little interest in established truth and hence refused to engage in 
the laborious business of checking facts, annotating and integrating sources, testing 
conclusions, structuring valid inferences, etc..6 Many angry observers, however, simply 
dumped this into the dirt of the wash water, supplementing their collections of ad 
hominem hearsay suggesting that McLuhan was at best a radically inconsistent and 
untrustworthy personality, at worst a dandy and dilettante. 
  
How otherwise, they asked rhetorically and recurringly, could McLuhan be disinterested 
if not contemptuous of commonplace facts and established standards, disregarding 
counterexamples and disciplinary boundaries and insisting that colleagues follow his 
lead in "connecting things", despite his knowing little of the things being connected – as 
if, as an acquaintance remarked, "he were simply telling a story or recounting a dream"? 
How could a teacher of integrity, it was said, consistently grade the papers of graduate 
students solely in proportion to the number of "new ideas" they broached? How could a 
viable scholar use puns, witticisms, raw humour and even ridicule in trying to change 
the world rather than describe it, becoming famous in the process and, scandalously 
and openly, liking it – while it lasted? (This was, after all, a man reputed to have told 
others that black masses were being held at Casa Loma, surgery was terrifying, all great 





The third reason is related to the second. McLuhan not only violated the precedents of 
scholarly presentation. He refused to follow them. He claimed recurringly, that is, to be 
doing something other than writing history, philosophy or science. 
 
By all accounts, McLuhan acted as if his historical conjectures were true and justified. 
Nevertheless, he acted almost always as if any attempt on his part to establish their 
truth would have been a waste of his time – as if he thought that one could perceive 
them to be true without argument or evidence, much as one saw that a chair was red, if 
one only opened one's mind wide enough – and hence considered the structures 
commonly supposed by others to assist the comprehension and testing of historical 
claims to be foreign to his purposes.  
 
 
6 Few have even tried to reconcile this with the obvious, consistent and long-term 
evidence that McLuhan was a devout Catholic, a political conservative, a near-worshipper of 
tradition and a man infatuated with medieval literature and philosophy and their sources.  
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He seemed, in short, to be using historical conjectures for a purpose other than 
achieving historical illumination. 
 
To many observers, especially those who never met him and hence knew of him only 
through his writings rather than through conversations, this simply confirmed their 
suspicions: McLuhan was speaking nonsense because he hadn't taken the time to 
understand what he was doing. 
 
This opinion deserves respect, for there is no doubt that had McLuhan tested his 
conjectures cautiously, he would have found the academic world a more amenable 
place in which to live. (Reading Popper late in life almost convinced him of this, but not 
quite.) Had he done so, he would have recognised, critics remarked, that, by his own 
account, one could not possibly encompass "non-linear" ideas within a "linear" medium 
(he would have realized, in short, that all attempts to subvert the constraints of a linear 
medium were subverting its capacity to convey sense, for linearity is how sense is 
created within linear media). He would therefore have solved the biggest problem of his 
intellectual career, "the problem of how best to translate his thinking into the medium 
of the printed word", and would have deflected the aim of those critics who quite 
rightly saw his books as manifesting the very confusion between medium and message 
of which he so often accused others.7 
 
He would have avoided a host of diversionary confusions as well, as when he 
suggested, for example, that mathematics is auditory while logic is visual, even 
though the history of the subjects in the 20th-century has shown the substantial 
equivalence of the two. 
 
He might even have sensitized himself to the sensory arts, though that might be 
asking too much. (It is odd, after all, that a man so concerned with "sensory 
ratios" could be completely oblivious to every one of the sensory arts of western 
civilization! One looks in vain in McLuhan for any appreciation of painting, music, 
sculpture, architecture or even the non-ideational aspects of poetry or Joycean 
prose, his own specialities. Best keep in mind, however, that Kant, originator of 
the most riveting aesthetic theory of the 18th century and even after, possessed 
no aesthetic sense whatsoever.)  
 
But these are superficial matters. The crucial point is that McLuhan, rightly or wrongly, 
thought he was engaged in a task within which his conjectures were means to other 
ends rather than ends in themselves. Two questions are therefore unavoidable. 
 
 
7 The summation is Marchand's. See Marchand, op. cit., page 235. 
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Methodologically, what was McLuhan doing? and was he right to do 
it?  
 
The answer, I suggest, is that McLuhan was engaged in a therapeutic endeavour similar 
to that of the later Wittgenstein. If so, the classic-comic construal of his achievement, 
however well-intentioned, is a caricature gone awry.  
 
Let me, then, open two windows onto the method of McLuhan that may shed some 
light upon it. 
 
 
Part 2:  
Two Windows on McLuhan 
 
McLuhan tried recurringly to say, or to hint at, what he thought he was doing. None of 
these remarks were developed, all were barely suggestive and yet there is a haunting 
consistency about the metaphors he used upon which it would be wise to mediate:  
 
*. He was, like Sherlock Holmes, a sleuth, playing the rôle even to the point 
of agreeing to be photographed in costume and admonishing children, when 
interrogating their world, to do so as Holmes had done. 
 
*. He was searching for the "patterns" by which things related in atypical 
ways to one another.  
 
*. He was compelled to report the results of his investigations in a "mosaic", 
"associative" or "conversational" manner akin to the "analogical" or metaphoric 
method of Aquinas, the "aprioristic" method of Bacon or the "Ideogrammic" 
method of Ezra Pound, rather than a literary one. 
 
*. He was 'probing' as surgeon's probe, or as 'probes' are sent by scientists 
into distant regions of space around Mars or Venus. 
 
He gave other hints, equally elliptical, that were even more striking:  
 
*. He was attempting to combat the "somnambulism" of his culture 
pervaded by beings walking in their sleep. 
 
*. He was seeking insight with "emotional equanimity". 
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*. He was trying to invert the way in which we perceive the figure/ground 
relationship of things, diverting our attention from the "figure" to the "ground".  
 
*. He was seeking to divert our attention to the unintended rather than the 
intended effects of technology (to the 'back-ground' connections) rather than 
the intended effects (the figure connections). 
 
*. He was attempting, as it were, to peering through a microscope, engaged 
in a process of "observation minus ideas". 
 
We may conclude from McLuhan's metaphors that he thought that he was acting 
consistently and in a manner uniquely appropriate to his purposes, however uncommon 
it might be.  
 
But what method, if any, could McLuhan have had in mind? Or, better put, what 
method would accord with what he did regardless of what he had in mind? What 
method, in particular, could account for that uncommon combination of traits, 
universally attested by friends and enemies who knew him, of the utmost seriousness 
about what he was doing combined with an almost child-like carelessness and disregard,  
indeed flippantly so, for the possible truth of what he was saying? What method could 
account both for McLuhan's consistency and persistence and yet for his delight in 
treating ideas as "music" (echoing T. S. Eliot) to the scandal of academics?8  
 
I think I now know what McLuhan was doing, albeit unwittingly, and shall soon tell you 
what I believe about it (see 'Window 2' below); but I wish firstly to say something about 
his notion of sensory ratios, for that, too, deserves reconsideration. 
 
Window 1: the Sensory Ratios: 
 
The medieval notion of the ratio of the senses is nowhere near as self-evidentially 
nonsensical as McLuhan's critics would have one believe. 
 
The medieval conjecture was largely phenomenological, and, for all we know, those who 
advanced it may have gotten it more rightly within their simpler intellectual 
environment than we can now reconstruct it within our cluttered one. (To Bacon we 
 
8 When presenting this lecture, I summarised at this point McLuhan's notorious and 
exemplary encounter with the distinguished sociologist, Robert Merton, as recounted by 
Marchand, op. cit, pages 132 and 133. See the Appendix to this essay. [Note added 30 April 
2019] 
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also owe the metaphor of time being a river that carries the shit along while dropping 
the good things to bottom, contrary to our 19th-century progressivism.) 
 
One encounters objects by multifaceted patterns of stimulation impressing themselves 
primarily upon a single sense (we are, as we say, seeing or hearing or touching it, etc.). 
As they do so, however, imaginative expectations of possible future impressions are 
generated simultaneously and in complex ways for all of the senses.9 
 
To McLuhan, one was never to categorize a technology by the predominant sense that it 
impressed, but rather by the senses terminally impressed (and perhaps even imagina-
tively so – though he was far from consistent about this). Seeing a photograph could 
therefore be a more 'tactile' experience than  sensing of the temperature of the room in 
which one sits, or radio might be a more 'visual' medium than television with newspa-
pers more 'auditory' than either.  
 
I am not claiming here that they are as McLuhan thought they were, nor 
that it is even worth wondering about. I am suggesting simply that the 
medieval conception may quite possibly be articulatable, perhaps even 
formalizable and maybe even useful, and that McLuhan, however 
muddled his conception of it may have been, need not have apologized 
for failing to find a refutation of it in his critics. 
 
Window 2: the Logical Pun: 
 
We use words in many ways, registering how diversely when we encounter them within 
uncommon contexts from which multiple meanings may emerge – within poetry, for 
example, or, as McLuhan recurringly showed, within advertisements, puns or jokes.  
 
McLuhan was particularly of puns, and his fondness for puns, I suggest, is the key to 
understanding his method – that is, his peculiarly "aphoristic" use of discrete and oft- 
inconsistent bundles of theory-like sentences. 
 
Sentences consist of words, and the meaning of a word, as Peirce insisted, is a bundle of 
theories. The meaning of the word 'heavy', for example, is the set of sentences that we 
believe would be true if and only if anything were heavy. When we assert a sentence, 
therefore, we assert not only the message encompassed explicitly by its words but 
implicitly the entire range of theories that constitute their meanings. We thus project 
 
9 When asked for examples, males in my classes responded routinely with 'Playboy 
centerfolds', black net stockings, etc.. The females remained silent. 
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implicitly the local logic of the language being used – a tiny part of the presupposed 
pattern of the medium. 
 
A pun is a word that sounds like the word whose place it usurps in a sentence, bringing 
simultaneously to consciousness the diverse meanings of both words and thus both 
sentences (the one articulated, the other implied). When punning, our attention shifts, 
as McLuhan put it, from the "foreground" to the "ground. 
 
A pun, therefore, both expresses a dual message and draws attention to the 
medium being used. It thus manifests the logical presuppositions that we bring 
to the use of the local words of the language – presuppositions of which we were 
previously unaware.  
 
I have been speaking of punning with words. Sentences, however, like words, can be 
used in many ways, though few before Wittgenstein thought much about it. The 
sentence 'The King is dead', for example, is used differently when encountered by the 
reader of a novel than when read as a headline in the morning newspaper, or when 
used by a teacher of English to illustrate sentence structure. An intriguing question 
arises. 
 
If we can pun with words, can we pun with sentences as well?  
 
Yes! and by pondering the answer, we can begin to understand what McLuhan was 
doing, and why so many have misconstrued the seriousness of his achievement. 
 
McLuhan managed to construct puns out of whole 
sentences describing media and thus exposed the logical 
presuppositions of entire technological world-views. 
 
Theories are general sentences uttered with the intention of making assertions about 
the world. Conversely, general sentences are generally used to assert theories. McLuhan 
recurringly uttered general sentences and appeared thereby to be articulating theories. 
(Sometimes, indeed, he mistook them for theories, and insofar as he did so, deserves 
the censure he received.) Most of the time, however, and often articulately so, he 
denied that he was offering theories about the world. Most of the time, indeed, he 
claimed to be doing something other despite his use of general sentences.  
 
What could he have been doing? Or, generally construed, to what other use 
could the utterance of a theory-like generalizations be put?  
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Suppose that the members of a society were to believe that a certain sentence were 
true (call it the 'target'). Suppose secondly that they were also to believe, albeit 
unaware, that a family of logically-related propositions were true. (I assume here, with 
Bains and William James, that one 'believes' whatever one is prepared to act upon, whe-
ther or not one knows it.) 
 
Suppose then, thirdly, that someone were to enter the society and articulate both the 
target sentence and an alternative family of them, logically related in the same way to 
the target sentence as those presupposed, the effect of which was to throw the 
contingent character of first set into sharp and unaccustomed focus. Suppose, that is, 
that the provocateur were to surround the target sentence with a bundle of logically-
supportive but weird proto-theoretical sentences.  
 
The target sentence would now convey at once two meanings, the old and the 
new! It would have become a sentential pun drawing attention from itself to the 
contingency of the medium – to the precariousness, that is, of the Weltan-
schauung previously presupposed by unattended. 
 
The provocateur need not believe that she is uttering truths, or may be uninterested in 
the truth-value of her proto-theoretical utterances, if true. She need only have noticed 
that the set is a logical alternative to the first, and that the society requires the 
articulation of such an alternative if the members are again to become self-reflective 
about the propositions they unreflectively believe. 
 
What, then, did McLuhan do? McLuhan, like Innis, believed that the members of a 
society remain unaware of both the media pervading it (its technologies of communi-
cation, including its languages) and their effects. We, in particular, have become 
"numbed" to the media that pervade our culture, both to our spoken language, to the 
other language of print, and to the newer electronic media that are supplanting them, 
and to their effects upon us. We are, like Hitler, "somnambulists" – sleepwalkers 
drugged by the pervading technologies of our culture. 
 
McLuhan wished to dispel the numbness, and his method was to turn ordinary 
sentences describing the media and their effects into sentential puns by 
surrounding them with alternative theory-like logically-related sentences – 
thereby throwing the background presuppositions into relief.  
 
But now the necessity of McLuhan's method ought also to be clear. Why didn't McLuhan 
simply describe the background and thereby draw our attention to it? For the same 
reason that Wittgenstein insisted that some things – among them the essential logical 
form of a language – can only be shown, never said.  
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McLuhan was convinced that it would be useless to attempt to describe a new ground 
against which to measure our commonplace assumptions concerning radio, television, 
film, newspapers, politics, economics, etc.. No one articulate a novel theoretical 
background from alternative premises believed to be more secure, for the premises 
themselves would necessarily embody the entire implicit theoretical baggage of the 
language. If, as McLuhan believed, what a medium does depends simply on it being 
used, regardless of what is being used for, then using the language logically to construct 
a new message would simply reaffirm the very ground that one wanted to throw into 
disrepute. 
 
The only method available to McLuhan, therefore, was to push us into 
confronting the pattern of presuppositions through which we habitually 
encounter the objects and events about us – not by constructing an alternative 
articulated world-view for us but rather by forcing us implicitly to reconstruct 
our own, for, in his view, one cannot articulate alternative world-views. One can 
only prod people into re-constructing them for themselves from disconnected 
bundles of theory-like sentences – from clues, analogies, probes, aphorisms, etc..  
 
One cannot logically do otherwise.  
 
Derrick De Kerckhove, McLuhan's successor as director of the Centre for Media and 
Technology, once remarked that McLuhan was like "an adult playing in a garden of 
delightful ideas".10 (p. 261). The analogy of a garden was apt and the description of 





As the more curious of you will have noted, I have unabashedly assimilated McLuhan's 
method of sentential punning with Austin and Wittgenstein's method of examples, for 
the three of them, it seems to me, were attempting to teach us how to get at things that 
can only be shown but never said – even though one must say other things for the show 
to go on. Wittgenstein believed, of course, that anything sayable could be said clearly, 
while McLuhan held that "clear prose indicates the absence of thought".11 But that, as 
they say, is show business. 
 
10 See Marchand, op. cit., page 261. From an undated interview with De Kerckhove by 
Marchand.. 
11 Marchand, op. cit., page 154. Marchand's source for this quotation is unclear. It 
seems to have been taken either from an interview with McLuhan conducted by Richard 
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A pertinent question, however, remains. Metaphorically speaking, how ought we then 
to think of the design of "The Gutenberg Galaxy" as a text? To what can we compare it? 
To what else in our experience is it most alike?  
 
I suggest the following. Imagine that you are attending the opening of a gallery exhibit 
of recent paintings by a friend. The paintings are arranged along the walls, and 
thoughtfully so, but the arrangement fails to constitute a "mosaic", a "collage" or any 
other articulatable pattern, and neither the paintings nor the exhibit, of course, are true 
or false. Yet the exhibit relates to the world, is somehow about the world to which it 
relates, and each painting within it is about the world to which it relates as well. But 
how so?  
 
Suppose your friend, the painter, were to enquire of you what you thought of a 
particular painting, and you were to respond without enthusiasm. Suppose, 
consequently, she wished to change your mind. What ought she to say? 
 
If she has sense, she will refrain from arguing with you, for your reply to her question, 
conveying how you saw the painting and how upon hearing the question you were 
compelled to register your seeing of it, may well have been occasioned without your 
having entertained within yourself any 'defense' of it. She ought wisely, that is, to 
refrain from acting as if you are thinking incoherently, or your view of art is old-
fashioned or your knowledge of contemporary technique faulty. Rather, she ought to 
say whatever she can say to get you to look and look and look again at the painting, 
harder each time!  
 
If she can do that, she will have won the game regardless of whether she spoke 
truly or otherwise, for you will have learned how to see it differently.  
 
The Gutenberg Galaxy, I suggest, ought to be construed as a linguistic analogue to a 
gallery of paintings or to the collected musical compositions of a composer (McLuhan 
once referred to T. S. Eliot's "music of ideas"). Each bundle of sentences hangs within 
the book as a discrete package, ordered and thoughtfully so, but one can turn in various 
directions. Some packages relate to others, some do not, but all relate to the world, and 
some, if conjectures, may indeed by true.  
 
 
Kostelanetz as published within his "Marshall McLuhan: High Priest of the Electronic Village" in 
Master Minds (New York, New York: MacMillan, 1967) or from a letter of McLuhan to Gerald 
Dunne of 24 July 1970. 
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Rather than compelling you to see the world anew and more truly, 
however, the point of the exhibit is to get you to think and think and 
think again of the commonplace assumptions that one makes, daily and 
unwittingly, about the media.  
 
If one does so, McLuhan has won the game! For he will have hung his ideas within a 
gallery of your mind, and you will thereafter have been immunized from the unintended 
effects of the media within which technologically we live, move and have our being. 
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Appendix12 
 
McLuhan contra Merton 
 
Readers unfamiliar with the life and legend of Marshall McLuhan may well 
underestimate how odd a figure he cut within the academic world and how difficult it 
was for friends and foes to reckon what to make of him. No better introduction to the 
puzzle can be given, I think, than to ponder Philip Marchand's report of McLuhan's 
notorious encounter of 1955 with the distinguished sociologist, Robert Merton. 
 
McLuhan’s first important opportunity, after the close of the seminar, to 
articulate the possibilities of the new era before an American audience came in 
November 1955. Louis Forsdale, a young instructor at Columbia University 
Teachers College and a reader of [McLuhan's] Explorations, invited McLuhan to 
speak on the topic of communications at a seminar at Columbia. Forsdale felt 
rather daring inviting this relatively unknown professor to speak at a gathering 
that included academic heavyweights such as Robert Merton, perhaps the most 
distinguished American sociologist at that time. His feeling of risk-taking was 
fully justified by the event.  
 
The first paragraph of McLuhan’s paper stunned the audience. It began with a 
reference to Freud, included a complex analogy between psychoanalysis and X-
ray photography, and ended with a capsule history of the effects of the ancient 
Roman road. McLuhan then launched into a précis of his recent media 
discoveries, citing Innis’s insight that any changes the media of communication 
are inevitably followed by enormous social change and elaborating on the 
effects of print, the telegraph, newspapers, radio, and television. He ended by 
warning his listeners that they were living in an "age of paratroopers" and that 
any attempt to counteract the effects of the new media in the classroom by a 
chaste concentration on the good old monuments of literature or culture was 
entirely futile.13  
 
When McLuhan finished, Forsdale asked if there were any questions. Robert 
Merton, his face flushed with emotion, was the first to speak. "Well, Professor 
McLuhan," he said, "there were many things about your paper that need cross-
examination. Uh, I don’t know where to begin . . . with your title or your first 
 
12 See Marchand, op. cit., pages 132-133. [Appended to this revision of the essay on 30 
April 2019. See footnote 8, page 9, above.] 
13 Here, within a footnote, Marchand cites the paper by McLuhan that he has 
summarised, despite it being seemingly 'no longer available': '"Educational Effects of the Mass 
Media of Communications", paper delivered at Columbia University, November 1955, 
unpublished, NA.' 
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paragraph." A light glimmered in McLuhan's eye. "Let’s begin with the first 
paragraph," Merton continued, vibrant with the resolution of an umpire about 
to eject a manager who’d gone too far. "You don’t like those ideas?" McLuhan 
interrupted with a shrug. "I got others.". 
 
Forsdale is not sure anybody laughed at McLuhan’s remark. "You don't laugh at 
Robert Merton," he points out. McLuhan, in any case, could hardly have done 
more to win forever the label of "unsound" not only at the University of Toronto 
but in the highest circles of American university life. It is the kind of remark that 
is repeated and relished for a long afterward in faculty lounges. "McLuhan’s 
response was really outside the academic pale," Forsdale comments.  
 
What you do in academia is debate. You go over points and you 
describe things carefully, you define and you come to an agreement or 
you lock horns and you talk about the research that you can bring to 
bear on this point of view or the research that you can bring to bear on 
that point of view, and McLuhan wasn’t doing it. He was just saying, 
"This is my idea."14 
 
At that point, McLuhan was not deliberately trying to violate the rules of 
academic debate. His particular response was the one that happened to occur 
to him. Later, of course, he cultivated the technique of the outrageous brush-off 







14 The quotation is from an undated interview with Louis Forsdale by Marchand. 
